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                                   NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
                 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
                     FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
                                 
                          No:  01-2153 
                                 
                    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
                                 
                                 
                                v. 
                                 
                         JOHN FLEMING, 
                                 
                                Appellant 
                                 
                                 
        On Appeal From the United States District Court 
            for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
                 D.C. Criminal No. 99-cr-00593 
             District Judge: Hon. J. Curtis Joyner 
                                 
        Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
                        February 5, 2002 
                                 
         Before: BECKER, McKEE & BARRY, Circuit Judges 
                                 
                       MEMORANDUM OPINION 
                  ( Filed:  February 20, 2002) 
                                 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
     John Fleming appeals the sentence imposed after he pled guilty to 
violations of 18 
U.S.C.  2252(a)(2), and (a)(4).  He argues that the district court erred 
in failing to credit 
him with a three point reduction in sentence pursuant to U.S.S.G.  
3E1.1(a) and U.S.S.G.  
 3E1.1(b)(2).  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
     Inasmuch as we write only for the parties, we need not set forth the 
facts and 
circumstances underlying this appeal except insofar as it is helpful to 
our brief discussion.  
The defendant asserts that the district court erred in considering conduct 
that he engaged 
in after entering a plea.  He stresses that the conduct may have been 
distasteful, vulgar, 
and even reprehensible, but that it was not unlawful.  He argues that the 
"government's 
suggestion that the Appellant should lose acceptance points because a 
third party mailed 
Appellant 'objectionable material' flies in the fact of common sense." 
[sic] Appellant's 
Br. at 14.  The defendant concedes that a court may rely upon post-
indictment unlawful 
conduct in determining whether to grant  3E1.1 reduction for acceptance 
of 
responsibility, quoting Ceccarini 98 F.3d at 130, but argues that the 
district court erred in 
relying upon lawful conduct to deny a reduction in sentence.  We disagree. 
     A district court has substantial discretion in determining whether or 
not a 
downward departure is appropriate under the sentencing guidelines.  Koon 
v. United 
States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996).  Under  3E1.1(a) a defendant is entitled to a 
reduction in 
sentence if he or she "clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility. 
. . ."  Despite 
defendant's protestation to the contrary, the issue here is not the 
legality of the 
defendant's behavior, but the significance of that behavior insofar as it 
reflected upon his 
purported remorse and "acceptance of responsibility" for his offense.  We 
need not 
comment on the defendant's argument that he ought not to be punished for 
materials 
which he received from third parties because the district court's sentence 
is more than 
justified by the content of materials which the defendant himself sent to 
others.  
     The evidence that the government introduced at sentencing included 
numerous 
letters which evidenced a total absence of remorse and no acceptance of 
responsibility 
whatsoever beyond the simple fact of the plea agreement itself.  However, 
"entry of a 
guilty plea does not entitle a defendant to a  3E1.1 reduction as 'a 
matter of right.'" 
U.S.S.G.  3E1.1, Application Note 3.  The sentencing court correctly 
determined that 
defendant's letters painted a much clearer picture of his remorse and 
acceptance of 
responsibility than his guilty plea.  In one such letter, dated November 
8, 2000, the 
defendant expressed his gratitude for materials containing the kind of 
references to 
children that had led to his prosecution in the first place.  He also 
spoke of how he missed 
the "good old days," of having sex with children.  App. 106-107a.  Indeed, 
given the 
quality and quantity of the proof which the government introduced in 
opposition to a 
downward departure, defendant's argument on appeal is specious at best. 
     The defendant has also filed a pro se brief in which he raises 
several arguments in 
addition to the argument raised by counsel.  However,  "[e]xcept in cases 
in which 
counsel has filed a motion to withdraw under Anders v.  California, 386 
U.S. 738 (1967), 
parties represented by counsel may not file a brief pro se."  3rd Cir.  
LAR 31.3 (2002).  
Accordingly, we would usually ignore the numerous assertions raised only 
in Fleming's 
pro se brief.  See United States v. Essig, 10 F.3d 968, 973 (3d Cir. 
1993).  Here, however, 
we will depart from that practice because the government concedes that one 
of the 
arguments raised in the pro se brief warrants remand for resentencing.  
Accordingly, we 
will briefly address that argument. 
     In "Argument Four" of his brief, the defendant appears to argue that 
the district 
court erred in imposing a sentence of 86 months under Count II (charging  
possession of 
child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C.  2252(a)(4)) because the 
maximum is only 
five years.  The government interprets this argument the same way we do, 
and agrees that 
the district court erred.  The government asserts that, inasmuch as the 
defendant also 
received a concurrent sentence of 86 months on Count I of the indictment 
for violating 18 
U.S.C.  2252(a)(2) (receiving child pornography), we should remand to 
allow the court 
to correct the sentence on Count II.  The defendant and the government are 
both wrong, 
and remand is not necessary. 
     Prior to October 30, 1998,  2252(b)(2) provided that a person who 
violated  
2252(a)(4) and had a prior conviction "relating to the possession of child 
pornography," 
could receive an enhanced sentence of "not less than 2 years nor more than 
10 years." 18 
U.S.C.  2252(b)(2).  In 1985, Fleming confessed to sodomizing a 10 year 
old boy and 
pled guilty to "Sodomy in the First Degree," in state court in Delaware.   
However, that 
conviction would not have justified an enhancement to his current sentence 
because it 
was obviously not a conviction "relating to the possession of child 
pornography."   
However, that enhancement was amended as of October 30, 1998.  The amended 
provision allows for a maximum sentence of 10 years under  2252(a)(4) 
when a 
defendant has a prior conviction "relating to . . . abusive sexual conduct 
involving a minor 
. . . ." Fleming was arrested on February 5, 1999, after that amendment 
became effective.  
He is therefore subject to 10 year maximum sentence, and the district 
court properly 
imposed a sentence that did not exceed that statutory maximum.  
     Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of sentence imposed by the 
district 
court. 
TO THE CLERK: 
     Please file the forgoing opinion. 
                              By the court, 
 
                                  /s/ Theodore A. McKee 
                                   Circuit Judge 
